Many defined benefit (DB) plans were closed to new entrants and/or frozen after the market crash in 2001 and the financial crisis in 2008. Due to many reports of the demise of DB plans, advisers might think all these plans would be terminated by now. However, many are still in existence and are—despite significant market returns during the past few years—still underfunded. As plan sponsors struggle with the volatility of their plan's funded status and the increasing expenses required to maintain them, they are looking for assistance. PLANADVISER spoke with Russ Proctor and Marty Menin, directors with Pacific Life in their Retirement Solutions Division, about the challenges defined benefit clients face, how some of them mirror challenges faced by defined contribution (DC) plans, and the solutions retirement plan advisers can consider to help resolve these issues.
PLANADVISER: First, why is funded status volatility a problem for frozen defined benefit [DB] plans?
Marty Menin: Volatility is somewhat accepted for an ongoing plan that is still accruing benefits for the company's employees. However, once the plan is frozen and employees are not earning any additional benefit, the volatility is just a financial irritation to the company. Add to that volatility the increasing administrative expenses, including Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation [PBGC] premiums, and now it's more costly than ever to maintain these frozen DB plans.
PA: Many companies have not fully funded their plans hoping to earn their way out of this underfunding problem. Advisers know that doesn't work when saving in your 401(k) plan, but how has that worked on the DB side?
Russ Proctor: Yes, that's a good comparison. Just hoping your 401(k) plan earns its way into the retirement income that you need is not going to work, without putting some money in, and for the DB plan, this really has not worked out very well either.
At the end of 2008, the average large plan was 78.3% funded. (1) The total funding shortfall for all of these plans was about $250 billion. At that time, the S&P 500® index was at 826 and the 10-year Treasury was 2.25%.
Move forward to May 31, 2017, the 10-year Treasury is about the same at 2.21% and the S&P 500® index has increased almost 200% to 2,412. On top of that, the Milliman 100 companies have contributed more than $385 billion to these pension plans during this time, more than the underfunding that was there back in 2008.
One would think the plans would be in a surplus position with that level of contributions and the approximate annual 12.8% market returns. Sadly, the funded status is still well short of 100% and stands at only 83.8%, an increase of only 5.5% during that time frame. (2)
PA: How is it possible that these plans are still that far underfunded given the increase in equities and that level of contributions?
Marty: Not all of those Milliman 100 plans are closed and frozen. Thus, some of those contributions are being used to fund the increases in the accrued benefits. Also, not all of the assets are invested in equities. Most sponsors would find it too risky to be 100% in equities in their pension plan similar to how an individual approaching retirement might not want to be 100% in equities. Therefore, not all of their assets are increasing at that historical rate of 12.8% per year. Other assets may be invested in a fixed income or traditional "Best Efforts" LDI [liability-driven investment] strategy designed to move in the direction of the liability when interest rates change but not close the funding shortfall.
Russ: Speaking of interest rates, even though the 10-year Treasury is a common interest-rate benchmark, the pension liabilities for GAAP accounting are based on corporate bond rates (e.g., Citigroup Pension Discount Curve). These bond rates have decreased about 2% from 5.87% at 12/31/08 to 3.77% at 5/31/17. This 2% reduction in the liability discount rate would result in an increase in pension liability of 20% to 30%. The fixed income or LDI assets should increase as interest rates decrease to offset this increase in liability. However, a best-efforts LDI strategy cannot guarantee that assets will increase the same as the liability when the discount rate changes.
Finally, the increasing ongoing administrative expense of maintaining the DB plan is eating away at the funded status.
PA: What are the risks for sponsors and advisers as they continue to try to earn their way out of an underfunding situation?